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Introduction 
 
Recent administrative studies of change in organisations have been influenced by the 
new institutionalism approach to political science and the idea of path dependence 
(March and Olsen, 1989:167-168; North, 1996:100). The original creation of 
organisations and the evolution and interaction between organisations and their 
environment have established the prevailing practices that are institutionalised through 
rules, norms and procedures. Olsen points out that organisations may be conceptualised 
as institutions, with a set of rules and routines which “define legitimate participants and 
agendas, prescribe the rules of the game, and create sanctions against deviations as well 
as establish guidelines for how the institution may be changed” (1991:131). For 
instances it is expect to find in institutionalised organisations certain practices and 
procedures which guide the actions and organise the way units operate and articulate 
among them internal issues and problems. This institutional framework embodies an 
organisational culture, and shapes values, beliefs and interests (March and Olsen, 
1989:53-55). This is an useful approach to analyse the process of change in a traditional 
organisation and the persistence of institutional features. The continuity of traditional 
features can be explain by the concept of path dependence. 
According to Powell (1991:192), there is a path-dependence of patterns of 
development that perseveres within organisational procedures, and forms and shapes 
their future course. The path dependence concept explains how, even in processes of 
managed change, certain practices and structures are perpetuated over time. By path 
dependence I mean the process by which practices and procedures persevere because 
initial choices preclude future options. These are the institutional features that persist 
over time and are reproduced. They are elements that cannot change rapidly in response 
to perturbations in the environment. Thus, change and continuity are part of the same 
process. There are assorted features embedded in the culture which are reproduced and 
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which persist in organisations. March and Olsen (1989:168) argue that organisations 
“embed historical experience into rules, routines and forms that persist beyond the 
historical movement and condition”. 
North (1996:100) stresses the importance of history in the process of change, 
arguing that path dependence is a useful concept to understand today’s choices. Present 
and future actions are connected to the past. The new institutionalism approach to 
political science suggests that there is continuity in organisational choices. 
Organisations evolve over time in a process reflecting path dependence. Thus 
incremental change and continuity characterise the process of institutional change that 
has embedded within it a combination of constancy and a changing element. Changes 
are marginal adjustments “to the complex of rules, norms and enforcement that 
constitutes the institutional framework” (North, 1996:83). March and Olsen suggest that 
adaptation to an external environment follows the internal dynamic according to “an 
institution’s origin and history” (1991:256-257). This idea suggests that the organisation 
will reproduce certain features that are embedded in the culture and are the source of 
continuity. Organisations develop an assortment of rules, norms and meanings that are 
passed on to new generations through routines and repetition. In the case under analysis 
in this paper I will argue that there are disruptions in policy-making which lead the 
process of change but despite those pressures to change we can find patterns of 
continuity which are path dependent. 
 This is not to deny the influence of pressures for change or the possibility for 
managed change. It recognises, however, that absolute change is rare and associated 
with exceptional events that constitute a ‘crisis.’ Hence, it will be seen that even 
revolutionary developments in Portugal did not suppress the power of ‘path 
dependence.’ Thus, one would expect to find a permanent pattern which is preserved by 
the culture and is transmitted to newcomers through the socialisation process. Path 
dependence provide the key to understanding continuities and the persistence of culture 
in a bureaucracy. This is not a deterministic argument. Patterns of organisational change 
are subject to major disjunctures, but the powers of tradition and inherent structures 
create distinctive influences. Scott (1995: 135) points out that “each organisation has its 
own history and its own time-dependent line of development.” This source of 
institutionalisation influences the way organisations operate, and how they change over 
time. 
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 The management for change that occurred in a central public organisation with 
responsibility for industrial policy is used to explore the idea of path dependence. For 
many years industrial policy-making in Portugal was a bureaucratic activity performed 
by the Directorate-General of Industry (DGI), a centralised organisation which was 
established by the former regime3 with the aim of controlling the industrial sector. The 
DGI functioned according to the principles of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state 
(Graham, 1983: 224), with strict administrative controls to protect the domestic market 
and local industries from foreign products and newcomers. Nor did this role change 
following the democratic revolution in 1974, since the left-wing governments 
established at the time implemented, through various nationalisations, an interventionist 
economic policy that reinforced the bureaucratic administrative control of industrial 
activity. The growth of the state-owned companies became a source for the expansion 
and reinforcement of the directorate’s role in industrial policy. Hence, despite the 
democratic revolution there was a strong path dependence on industrial policy 
formulation and implementation. 
 Membership of the EEC in 1986, and the requirements of Community policies 
on economic liberalisation and competition, prompted changes in the DGI to improve 
the effectiveness of Portugal’s industrial strategy. These international pressures 
represented an important landmark in the policy changes that influenced the DGI’s 
operations and activities. Traditional administrative instruments for controlling 
industries disappeared, assorted programmes designed to develop industrial sectors 
were implemented, and policy formulation shifted from the domestic to the international 
arena. Industrial policy was no longer a domestic issue but was dependent on the 
agreements established in the Membership Treaty and on the bargaining amongst other 
EEC member at Brussels. Moreover, the emphasis on industrial policy shifted from a 
vertical approach according to industries or industrial sectors, to broader issues such as 
productivity, competitiveness, design, internationalisation and quality. This sort of 
development represented a major disjunction in the way the DGI functioned, and 
prompted changes in the Directorate’s organisation and operations to enable the 
requirement of the new policy issues to be dealt with. Therefore this case seeks to 
explain how practices and procedures persevere in a traditional organisation? 
 The concept of path dependence are used in the present research to explain the 
change process in a traditional organisation and the institutional reproduction of 
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tradition. It is expect that people will maintain procedures and processes which worked 
in the past because established practices gives a sense of security and the ‘way things 
are done’ in the directorate. 
 The analysis of the DGI’s reorganisation looks at recent changes by focusing on 
the continuities and the disruptions of policy-making. This paper argues that the 
political and economic transformation that occurred after the democratic revolution and 
the challenge of EEC membership represent a change in the DGI’s operations. 
However, the change management in the DGI showed path dependency where the 
response to external pressures follow the power of tradition which can only be 
explained by the norms, rules and procedures embedded in the culture. The paper draws 
upon an extensive body of interview material that was concentrated on senior officials 
and civil servants engaged in policy making and implementation. The interviews, which 
were semi-structured and held individually, took place between May 1997 and January 
1998. About thirty-two senior officials were interviewed, and data were written up 
immediately after each interview. 
 
 
Industrial Policy-making in Portugal 
 
The initial formulation of industrial policy goes back to the 1930 where import 
restrictions and barriers to new entrants to industry aimed to protect domestic industries. 
A sort of discretionary permission needed for entry into the market, and a long and 
costly administrative process dissuaded newcomers and limited the industrial growth of 
established industries. The Act of Industrial Limitation (Lei do Condicionamento 
Industrial) in practice protected domestic monopolistic conglomerates against internal 
and external competition (Confraria, 1992:187, Pimlott, 1977:337). In addition, there 
were severe restrictions to international trade through a policy of import substitution. 
For example, enterprises had to send the Directorate General of Industrial Services4 
(DGIS) details of the volume of production for the following year and their 
requirements in raw materials. Imports and exports were carried out on the basis of 
previous administrative permission, centralised in the DGIS according to the needs of 
the domestic market. Senior official confirm that the criteria for imports were arbitrary.5  
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Political guidance on foreign trade sent to the administration was intended to 
protect domestic industries, but the final decision belonged to bureaucrats who decided 
at central level what should or should not be imported. The administration had strong 
discretionary powers which were the source of lobbying and influence from domestic 
economic groups (Confraria, 1992:31). Administrative control of industries created an 
imbalance in industrial markets, with certain large companies and economic groups 
controlling the market from monopolistic positions (e.g., chemistry, banking and 
cement). In addition, the closed nature of the domestic market hampered the 
development of a strong and competitive industry. Hence, industrial policy was mainly 
a bureaucratic and administrative activity to control domestic industrial production and 
foreign trade. 
 The democratic revolution of April 1974 did not represent a rupture in industrial 
policy. Even though the powers of strong economic groups were severely reduced and 
the legal barriers to entry into the domestic market were removed, the protectionist 
nature of domestic industries remained in place through the quantity and tariff barriers 
to foreign trade. Operations in the DGI6 continue to be strictly administrative: i.e., the 
authorisation of imports and exports, and the exemption or otherwise from customs 
surtaxes. Moreover, the number of state-owned companies increased after the 
democratic revolution. Governments at the time, supported by left-wing parties, started 
a vast process of nationalisations in such areas as insurance, banking, power production, 
transport, chemicals, shipbuilding and other industries. The Constitution approved by 
the first Constituent Parliament reserved important industrial sectors as exclusive of 
state intervention, and authoritarian and bureaucratic types of control persisted. Pimlott 
(1977:350) points out that the revolution did not affect the exercise of economic power 
by the state administrative machine. Thus, industrial policy was based on the 
discretionary power of the state and followed the same bureaucratic control. The 
democratic revolution did not represent a rupture in policy the power of path 
dependence resisted revolutionary developments. 
 Portugal’s membership of the EEC in 1986 was a landmark for domestic 
industrial policy. Fundamental changes were required in market operations that shifted 
the  institutional  framework. EEC competitive policy provoked  changes in market 
regulations, prompted economic liberalisation, and pushed domestic industries into 
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intense competition. The old authoritarian and bureaucratic type of control was no 
longer suitable for the new framework, and this signalled a move from the direct 
intervention and control of the state towards a free market and a liberal policy. 
 The ‘new’ market was very competitive in price, quality and design, and the 
domestic industries were not ready to operate in such a competitive arena. The closed 
nature of the domestic market and the administrative control of investments had 
produced a labour-intensive and inefficient industrial sector. In addition, the 
requirements of the Single Market in 1992 produced pressure for the establishment of a 
policy to modernise and develop domestic industries. Therefore, it was necessary to 
support industrial modernisation as a way of helping domestic industries to adapt to the 
competitive market. Specific programmes, funded from EEC structural financial funds, 
were set up to support ways of improving the competitiveness of domestic industries. 
For instance, between 1989 and 1994 the DGI managed 53 billion escudos of state 
financial aid (DGI, 1994:43) to promote the introduction of new technology, improved 
productivity, work rationalisation, and quality and design. Moreover it prompted 
changes in approach to industrial policy issues. There was, for example, a shift from 
vertical industrial policies according to industries, towards a horizontal approach where 
competitive factors became the target of industrial policy. The new framework 
represented a shift in policy-making and the relationships among actors in 
administrative arena. 
 
Continuities and Disruptions in Policy-making 
 
Industrial policy-making was an administrative and bureaucratic activity over a 
long period of time. As happened with other governmental policies, the role of 
representative organisations in policy-making during the dictatorship regime was 
severely reduced. A strong and centralised administrative system became the regime’s 
tool in the decision- making process, which was restricted to the Prime Minister7 and to 
senior officials. Graham points out that “For all practical purposes, the making and 
implementation of public policy in the New State8 came to be limited to the 
bureaucratic arena,” and called the policy-making process “a regime of administered 
politics” (Graham, 1975:14). The bureaucratic elite, which controlled the policy process 
in decisions concerning economics, politics and social policy, progressively expanded 
                                              
7 - Salazar, who, as prime minister, ruled the country for 40 years under a dictatorship regime. 
 7
their power and pursued their own targets, thereby developing semi-autonomous 
organisational units. He argues that “each ministry became a kind of holding-company 
operating within its own policy... Within each ministry, there was a similar 
fragmentation existing among organisational sub units” (Graham, 1975:56). In the same 
way, the DGIS was a powerful directorate, responsible for controlling industrial activity 
that was operating with strong discretionary powers in a fragmented and semi-
autonomous way. Policy-making was fragmented according to industrial sectors, and 
there were sub-units within the directorate responsible for its formulation and 
implementation. For example, there were services responsible for the industrial policies 
for the textile, chemical, and metallo-mechanical industries. 
This fragmented approach to policy making did not change after the revolution. 
On the contrary, it can be seen in the analysis of DGI that there is a path dependence in 
industrial policy where fragmentation becomes more prominent. In the aftermath of the 
revolution, nationalisation increased the size of the public sector, thereby reinforcing 
administrative control of the nationalised industries. For example, the government, 
nationalised companies in areas such as insurance, banking, power production, 
chemistry and other industries. To control this vast public sector,9 the DGIS was split up 
in 1976 into seven directorates, each of which was responsible for a particular industrial 
sector or area: textiles and clothing, pharmaceuticals, ceramics and glass-making, wood 
and cork, food, heavy mechanical, industrial chemical, and electro-metallo-mechanic 
and electronic industries (Decree-Law 358/76). The directorates took a regulatory and 
developmental role vis-à-vis the industries under their supervision, in a repetition of the 
previous pattern of the DGIS. The administrative system found the revolutionary period 
offered fertile ground in which to expand the directorates’ influence and control over 
industrial policy, thereby reproducing the fragmented approach to policy formulation 
and implementation in a path dependency. Moreover, these sub-units reinforced the 
semi-autonomous and fragmented characteristics of Portuguese bureaucracy. 
The country’s membership of the EEC, however, prompted changes in industrial 
policy and in the decision-making process. First there was the abandoning of all sorts of 
foreign trade barriers. Secondly, the domestic market was opened to competition. 
Thirdly, industrial policy ceased to be a domestic issue and was subject instead to the 
competitive policies dictated from Brussels.  
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Traditional Bureaucracy and Response to Change 
 
The reorganisation of administrative structures responsible for industrial policy 
formulation and implementation followed the shift in policy. Economic liberalisation 
pressed for the establishment of an open market and prompted the necessity of 
supporting industrial modernisation to prepare domestic industries for the open market. 
The DGI was reorganised in 1982 as a ‘light and simple structure’ to answer the 
challenges of this economic liberalisation (Decree-Law 149/82:1050). It was the result 
of the merging of three directorates that had been responsible for transforming industry, 
metallurgy industry and electromechanical industry. However, this ‘new’ entity showed 
continuity in its structure, especially as it kept the previous segmentation among 
internal offices. There was a path dependency in the DGI’s internal units based on the 
traditional fragmented approach to industrial policy. The internal structure reproduced 
the sort of specialisation prevailing in the abolished directorates. For example, the 
internal structure had eleven operative services (the offices) whose areas were similar to 
the industrial sectors that had been under the control of the abolished directorates. There 
were offices responsible for the following: textile industries, food industries, general 
light industries, basic chemistry industries, light chemistry industries and electro-
mechanical industries. Within these offices there were specialised divisions responsible 
for specific industries. This is what Graham (1975:56) defines as fragmentation among 
sub-units in Portuguese public administration.  
 A major reorganisation in 199310 altered the DGI’s internal strucure to one more 
suited to the directorate’s new role and objectives. The vertical specialisation of offices 
was reduced from eleven vertical services to five. At the same time new offices were 
created to handle the broader issues arising from the new institutional framework 
imposed by EU membership. These offices dealt with such matters as industrial 
development, new technologies, competitiveness and industrial infra-structures. The 
internal grouping followed a matrix-type structure, which represented the organisational 
response to the pressures prompted by industrial policy. The rationale underlying the 
matrix structure was the interconnecting of both the vertical offices and the horizontal 
offices, in order to improve policy decision making (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 - Matrix Type Structure of DGI 
 
         Vertical Offices 
       (Specialised according to industries) 
 
     Office 1   Office 2   Office 3  Office 4 
 
    Office 1 
  Horizontal Offices 
(Specialised according   Office 2 
to issues: competitiveness, 
new technologies and work  Office 3 
safety) 
    Office 4 
 
 Source: DGI, 1994 
 
The move from a vertical specialisation to a matrix-type model was a response to the 
challenges of industrial policy. Policy formulation was not compatible with a 
fragmented approach to policy issues. The problems facing domestic industries were not 
just exclusive to one industry but were shared by them all. In particular, the Single 
Market of 1992 and the end of foreign trade restrictions made it essential to encourage 
domestic industrial competition. Senior officials had to concentrate on studies on the 
domestic industries in order to propose measures to promote new industries and 
industrial competitiveness. The directive and paternalistic approach of DGI to industrial 
issues was challenged, and had to be adjusted towards a more supportive role. The new 
industrial policy required a different approach to policy formulation – one that 
concentrated on competitive factors rather than on industrial sectors. For instance, 
issues that promoted competitiveness, such as productivity, quality, design and 
innovation, became crucial in industrial policy. Policy formulation and implementation 
required new skills which senior officials had to develop, and new methods and 
processes were also needed to deal with the increasing number of meetings in Brussels 
that concerned competitive policy and the management of EEC programmes. It required 
bargaining skills and good technical background support to protect the interests of 
domestic industries. Moreover, domestic industries no longer depended on 
administrative decisions in pursuing options related to their activity. A senior official11 
pointed out that with market liberalisation, enterprises did not care about DGI, except in 
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issues related to the PEDIP programme.12 At the same time, the DGI’s directorship was 
looking for a new role and a new image among industries. The then Director General 
commented that DGI’s activities were “guided according to Portuguese industry, 
through the promotion of several connections in critical areas of industrial 
competitiveness” (Rodrigues, 1990:23).  
 
 The bureaucratic response 
 
The ‘new’ directorate dealt with the idea of change by keeping the previous 
groups and their informal structures, thereby reinforcing continuity. And as a senior 
official pointed out, it was easy to identify the abolished directorates in the present 
structure because they stayed as a ‘block’.13 On the other hand, the reorganisation 
followed the traditional structure of Portuguese public administration, in that its 
structure was hierarchic and centralised with power concentrated in one person at the 
top: the Director-General 
 The new structure required dialogue among offices and extensive co-operation 
among them, and this was vital to its success. The strategic plan14 stressed that 
relationships with external actors should use the synergies of the organisation and avoid 
‘feudal’ work processes (Opções Estratégicas, 1994), while the Directorship regarded 
co-operation among units as critical to the policy-making process. However, this 
approach to problems went against the traditional culture, which was based on a 
fragmented and hierarchical approach to issues and to problem-solving. A struggle for 
information control started between vertical and horizontal offices. Some interviewees, 
for example, observed that the vertical offices sent information to horizontal ones, but 
that horizontal offices hardly ever sent information to them. Senior officials working in 
vertical offices complained that their offices had “no global information about 
processes”.15 One senior official explained this lack of co-operation as being due to the 
influence of culture: vertical offices were the most conservative because of their long 
service in the abolished directorates.16  
                                              
12 - The PEDIP (Specific Programme to Develop Portuguese Industry) is a domestic programme financed 
by EU structural funds to promote the modernisation and development of Portuguese industries. It was 
implemented in 1989 and there is now a PEDIP II. 
13 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 2/7/1997. 
14 - The four year Strategic Plan was designed to diagnose and to propose directions for, DGI’s activities. 
15 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 1/7/1997. 
16 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 8/1/1998. 
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Because of these difficulties, the matrix-type structure was not successful. 
Horizontal services have to work in a vertical way and must approach problems from a 
fragmented perspective. Senior officials and civil servants resisted the introduction of a 
more responsive, open and facilitative culture through the matrix type of organisation, 
and each office concentrated on its own work without worrying about what other offices 
were doing. Communication, too, followed the formal and written traditional pattern. 
The main administrative and hierarchical approach to issues and to problem-solving 
remained within the organisation, with each individual office reproducing its norms, 
rules and routines in a path dependence manner. Internal dynamics shaped and 
constrained the success of the matrix-type organisational model. 
 
The policy making process 
 
The sort of transformations, established by the EEC treaties, had a direct 
influence on the DGI’s responsibilities and operations, and represented a major shift in 
the administrative nature of industrial policy, since decisions concerning competitive 
policy were taken in an international arena and negotiated among other countries. There 
was a major change in the nature of the policy-making process. It moved from a 
technocratic process controlled by a bureaucratic organisation towards a complex 
structure of relationships where each participant tried to capture responsibilities. To 
deal with the complexity of policy there were several organisations that progressively 
required more intervention in policy formulation. This became more pressing with EEC 
membership and the prospect of having to manage financial incentives programmes. 
The struggle to attract and control these programmes shifted the influence of the DGI on 
policy. On the other hand, the formulation of policy needed to be co-ordinated with 
other actors in a sort of network of relationships. For example, senior officials admitted 
that they needed the background support of other organisations (enterprises, universities 
and research organisations) to support the Portuguese position in negotiations about 
EEC competitive policy, which had a direct influence on domestic industries.17 This 
required active participation in decision-making, something that was entirely different 
from the administrative and hierarchic traditional way of doing things. It also called for 
more flexibility, new skills and a new way to approach problems and their solutions. 
This represents a major challenge that has needed a more comprehensive approach, 
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combined with good bargaining skills. Senior officials have remarked that they were not 
equipped to participate in international meetings, which required high technical 
knowledge and lobbying skills.18 This represents a major shift from a bureaucratic 
approach towards a political approach to industrial policy. One senior official 
commented that there has been a change from a state that permits and inspects, towards 
a state which advises and supports.19 Senior officials in the DGI have been pushed to 
move from a directive and autoritarian culture to one with a more open and facilitative 
approach to problems. For instance, the Director-General has been trying to change the 
directorate’s image and to develop a strategy to expand relationships with the industry 
and its representatives. These changes have been structured into the consolidation of the 
organisation in its particular sphere and by the reinforcement of its influence among the 
various actors. Senior officials have realised that the DGI’s authoritarian and 
bureaucratic role was no longer appropriate for the new framework, although some 
senior officials consider the process has led to a loss of responsibilities.20 Hence, the 
nature of policy-making changed after Portugal had become a member of the EEC. 
Industrial policy was no longer a domestic issue managed by bureaucrats but a process 
that was dependent on international negotiations. The institutional framework shifted 
accordingly. The focal point of policy-making converged on Brussels, and policy 
formulation depended on negotiations with foreign partners. Policy-making required 
technical backward support, and new skills to equip senior officials to negotiate and 
participate in international meetings and to increase the participation of enterprises and 
other economic agents in formulating policies. Such attributes were critical in decision 
making to support and justify Portuguese options at EEC forums on domestic industrial 
policy and EEC competitive policy. 
 
Relationships with external players 
 
In the administrative arena there was a major shift in the position of the DGI. 
The ending of administrative control over imports and exports reduced its 
responsibilities and its influence on industrial activity. For example, enterprises wishing 
to pursue their foreign trade activities or to expand their production capacity no longer 
had to depend on permission from the directorate. Its former authoritarian style was 
                                              
18 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 8/1/98. 
19 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 24/6/1997. 
20 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 23/6/1997. 
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now incompatible with the new industrial policy and decision-making process. A senior 
official noted that until EEC membership they had carried out a kind of ‘administered 
industrial policy’, but that role was not possible any longer.21 The DGI had moved from 
being a regulatory agency to becoming a partner in industrial development, and was 
now promoting a more active relationship between the individual industry and the 
directorate. 
This new approach to policy-making was emphasised by a senior official who 
pointed out that the DGI needed to move towards enterprises with the target of giving a 
public service.22 The new industrial policy required an open approach to the issues 
under debate in order to make a more satisfactory adjustment to the national position 
during EEC negotiations. Senior officials and civil servants engaged in policy-making 
and policy implementation realised that the organisation’s previously negative image 
among enterprises called for a ‘rebadging’, since a new identity would strengthen its 
position. In looking for a new role, the directorship needed to improve its image among 
the industries. The strategic plan for 1994-1999 proposed several initiatives to ‘sell’ a 
new image of the organisation, such as increasing the dialogue with enterprises, 
improving delivery of services, and adopting a business-like language (DGI, 1994:74-
81). According to the Director General, senior officials needed to give priority to 
visiting enterprises and maintaining a dialogue with entrepreneurs, which could be 
regarded as “a ‘sine qua non’ condition to good service” (Rodrigues, 1990:24). 
However, senior officials resisted such openness and dialogue. Interviews make it clear 
that people objected to paying visits to companies because they were not accustomed to 
this practice, while Directors of Services were afraid of being overtaken by their 
subordinates; thus either the Directors of Services visited enterprises or no one would. 
But because Directors of Services generally did not visit enterprises, nobody undertook 
this activity at all.23 
 The horizontal nature of the new industrial policy became a fertile area for 
governmental organisations to expand their operations. The vast programme to 
modernise domestic industries, supported by structural funds from the EU, opened up 
opportunities for other central organisations to attract new responsibilities. The DGI, in 
fact, managed only the following incentive programmes: some sub-programmes of 
PEDIP (Specific Programme to Develop Portuguese Industry), a sub-programme of 
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22 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 2/6/1997. 
23 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 20/8/97 
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RETEX (Programme for Regions Dependent from Cloth and Textile Industries), and 
PRODIBE (Programme to Develop Equipment Industries). Meanwhile other public 
organisations were entering the administrative arena of industrial policy, where they 
competed with DGI for policy influence and the management of incentive programmes. 
For example, six governmental organisations24 shared the management of these 
programmes in areas such as productive investments, quality, internationalisation and 
foreign investment, innovation, industrial property, energy saving and environment. 
This has led to classic infighting among the central organisations within the ministry, 
where personal trust and a sympathetic attitude among senior officials to the wishes of 
politicians is a crucial factor in successfully attracting new responsibilities and 
participating in policy formulation. This personalistic feature was a legacy from the 
previous regime and was revitalised after the revolution. Hence, a lack of political 
confidence reduces the connection with politicians, thus weakening the directorate’s 
influence in policy-making and implementation. 
 Relationships between the ministry and the directorate depend on the minister’s 
political confidence in the Director General. Since the democratic revolution of April 
1974, a major shift has taken place in the power and influence of directorates on policy-
making and implementation. First, there was a change in the promotion procedure for 
the position of Director-General. The long-serving position of Director-General was 
replaced by a political appointment that lasts only for a three year term. This procedure 
is the same for the position of deputy Director-General. Other high positions (e.g., 
Director of Services and Head of Division) are promoted by competitive examination 
among senior officials. Secondly, there has been a trend for ministers to set up their 
own staff of advisors in their cabinet, and to transfer the responsibility for policy 
formulation from the directorates to the cabinet. For example, ministerial cabinets 
perform parallel activities alongside the DGI. A senior official remarked that the 
directorate had been losing its technical influence in policy-making.25 Policy-making 
has become a bargaining process among central organisations, and there is a permanent 
struggle between the minister’s cabinet, the directorate and other central organisations 
                                              
24 - These are the Institute for Support of Small and Medium Enterprises and Investment (IAPMEI), the 
Portuguese Institute for Quality (IPQ), the Investment, Trade and Tourism of Portugal organisation 
(ICEP), the National Institute of Engineering and Industrial Technology (INETI), the National Institute of 
Industrial Property (INPI), the Directorate-General of Energy (DGE) and the Directorate-General of 
Environment (DGA). 
25 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 24/6/1997. 
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to secure greater participation in the policy process where each participant operates as a 
‘holding company’ within its own sub-set of a policy. 
Industrial policy changes thus caused a major shift in the DGI’s operations. Not 
only was its administrative and bureaucratic character severely reduced but it was also 
required to adopt a more open and consultative process of policy formulation and 
implementation. This represented a setback for the DGI, which lost its role and 
importance in managing industrial policy. For instance, a senior official commented that 
prior to EEC membership his job, which was concerned with foreign trade, had been 
mainly administrative and that this had finished.26 Thus industrial policy was no longer 
a DGI ‘monopoly’ but instead had become an issue that had to be negotiated and 
bargained over with other players, and that required new skills and a different approach 
to problems and their solutions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper shows the importance of shifts in policy-making in the process of change in 
DGI and argue that despite the pressures for change there are patterns of continuity 
which are path dependent. The analysis shows that shifts in the nature of policy-making 
required a more open approach to policy-making and a different ways of doing things. 
The horizontal nature of industrial policy opened up an opportunity for other 
organisations to compete for policy formulation and implementation, and for the 
management of specific programmes to develop domestic industries. Management for 
change therefore focused on three main issues: development of new skills to deal with 
the policy making process, the improvement of relationships with external actors 
through a ‘DGI image’, and the internal reorganisation of the directorate. The analysis 
of the process of change within the DGI however reveal that the response shows 
institutional reproduction of tradition. Senior officials maintained those procedures and 
processes which were the ‘way things are done’ in the Directorate. There was continuity 
in traditional features which are partly due to the reluctance to change processes that 
have worked in the past and partly because new methods were incompatible with the 
established traditional methods. The normative framework embedded in the culture of 
the serving officials meant that they almost instinctively reject the new methods. Hence, 
                                              
26 - Confidential interview with a senior official on 2/7/1997. 
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despite political and economic transformation which occurred after revolution and with 
the EEC membership there was path dependency in the change management of DGI. 
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